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A Public Disclosure Program (PDP) is compared to a traditional environmental regulation (exem-
pliﬁed by a tax/subsidy) in a simple dynamic framework. A PDP aims at revealing the environmental
record of ﬁrms to the public. This information aﬀects its image (goodwill or brand equity), and ulti-
mately its proﬁt. In our model, this impact is endogenous, i.e., a ﬁrm polluting less than its prescribed
target would win consumer’s sympathy and raises its goodwill, whereas it is the other way around
when the ﬁrm exceeds its emissions quota. The evolution of this goodwill is assumed to depend also
on green activities or advertising expenditures. Within this framework, we analyse how a PDP aﬀects
the ﬁrm’s optimal policies regarding emissions, pricing and advertising as compared to a traditional
regulation. We show that advertising acts as a complementary device to pricing and that emissions are
increasing in goodwill. We also conclude that the eﬀects of a PDP are more pronounced than those of
traditional instruments for ﬁrms with a high goodwill. Moreover, we study under which conditions a
PDP may be proﬁt improving and we connect this issue to the possibility that a PDP can induce ﬁrms
to overcomply with the standard. The numerical value of the emission target is rather innocuous in
a market-based setting but it turns to be a crucial variable in the presence of a PDP. The theoretical
results are complemented with a numerical illustration.








  1 Introduction
As noted in Tietenberg (1998), the ﬁrst phase of pollution control involved mainly legal remedies such
as prohibitions or emissions standards. The second wave mainly involved market-based instruments such
as emission charges, subsidies or tradeable permits, which have substituted, or more commonly com-
plemented, legal remedies to control pollution. A more recent trend in environmental regulation involves
disclosing ﬁrms’ environmental information to the public. This paper studies the eﬀects of information dis-
closure strategies as an approach to environmental policy by comparison with traditional instruments. By
traditional instruments we mean command-and-control policies and, specially, market-based instruments.
Typically, economists recognize that market-based instruments have some economic advantages over
purely regulatory actions, such as being more cost-eﬀective and providing more incentives for innova-
tion, and have helped to overcome some of the limitations of the regulatory approaches. Nevertheless,
market-based approaches have not fully solved the problems either since the regulatory systems remain
overburdened by the sheer number of substances to be controlled and the burden of designing, implement-
ing, monitoring and enforcing an eﬀective pollution control system (Tietenberg 1998, pp. 587-588).
Monitoring is the process of verifying if the ﬁrm complies with environmental rules, whereas enforcement
is the undertaking of punitive actions to push the ﬁrm to improve its environmental performance (Foulon et
al. (2002)). Monitoring and enforcement are crucial for traditional environmental policies to work properly
as it has been shown in the recent literature. As for theoretical references, Harford and Harrington (1991),
Harrington (1988), and Heyes (1996) show that optimal ﬁnes need not be maximal, which diverges from
the well-known result in Becker (1968). On the empirical side, Magat and Viscusi (1990), and Laplante
and Rilstone (1996) show that inspections signiﬁcantly reduce absolute levels of water pollution emitted
by pulp and paper plants in the United States and Canada. Gray and Deily (1996) state that an increase
in enforcement actions in the US steel industry reduces noncompliance in air pollution. Nadeau (1997)
obtains that monitoring and enforcement actions diminish the duration of noncompliance, and Helland
(1998), that inspections encourage self-reporting. Kleit et al. (1998) predict that the penalty depends
essentially on the gravity of the violation and on the ﬁrm’s previous record of environmental violations.
Dion et al. (1998) show that regulators appear to monitor larger plants for visibility of their actions, but
avoid enforcing them for electoral reasons. Dasgupta et al. (2001) demonstrate that at the plant level, the
variation in frequency of inspections of industrial air- and water-pollution in China is a better determinant
of the ﬁrms’ environmental performance than is the variation in pollution levies. Staﬀord (2002) shows







  and Ward (2005) ﬁnd that a ﬁne produces a decrease of about two-thirds in violation rates and that the
majority of this impact can be attributed to reputation enhancement by the regulator. For a survey, see
Cohen (1998).
It has been pointed out that traditional instruments might be socially expensive and their results, in
practice, are often obstructed by aﬀected ﬁrms. According to EPA1 ex-Administrator William Reilly, for
instance, four out of every ﬁve decisions made by EPA are contested in court (see Heyes (2000)). Further,
it is recognized in the literature on environmental economics, that ﬁrms do not always fully comply with
the imposed regulation. For instance, Harford (1978), states that “In the case of both air and water
pollution standards, it has been the case that these standards have not always been complied with.” In
the United Kingdom, for example, “published compliance rates with many key water quality standards
are signiﬁcantly below 100%, sometimes as low as 50%, and the true compliance rates are likely to be even
lower” (Heyes (2000)).
Among the main diﬃculties for designing legal and market-based environmental policy instruments
are the requirements of information collection, aggregation and dissemination. As a natural result, a
subsequent stage in the evolution of pollution control involves improving information provision. In such
a context, information on ﬁrms’ environmental records has recently been seen as a supplement or an
alternative to traditional regulation (Konar and Cohen (1997)). This objective has been put into practice
by means of so-called Public Disclosure Programs (PDP), which basically consist in planned information
strategies used by the regulator to reveal the environmental performance of ﬁrms. The rationale behind this
strategy is that by making the information public, the polluters will be pushed to reduce their emissions
to avoid being punished by consumers and capital markets. This idea, which assumes implicitly that
consumers may prefer greener products and ﬁrms, has been put forward in the literature under diﬀerent
names and in diﬀerent contexts. For Porter (1991), it might pay to be green. For Kriström and Lundgren
(2003), green goodwill can explain why ﬁrms voluntarily reduce their emissions. It is also related to the
increasing importance of Eco-labels (see Mason (2006) for a theoretical analyses or Blend and Ravenswaay
(1999) for an application).
There is a recent growing literature addressing the economic and environmental eﬀects of PDPs from
an empirical point of view. The main focus of this strand of literature is on the reaction of capital markets
to the release of environmental information. Konar and Cohen (1997) obtain, for instance, that ﬁrms with
the largest decline in stock price when the information is made public reduce their emissions more than







  their industry peers. Badrinath and Bolster (1996) ﬁnd that, on average, there is a loss in value of about
$14.3 million during the week of the settlement. Hamilton (1995) reports that the stock value decreases
on average by $4.1 million on the day that the list of polluters is released. Lanoie et al. (1998) obtain
a diﬀerent result. Indeed, their analysis suggests that appearing on the British Columbia polluters’ list
has no impact on a ﬁrm’s equity value. On the other hand, Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) ﬁnd that
market valuation increases on average by $80.5 million following the announcement of an environmental
award. Similarly, Lundgren (2003) argues that “........by lowering the environmental risk via investments
in abatement capital, the company lowers its systematic risk (market risk), and as a consequence its total
risk. This tends to, ceteris paribus, increase the current stock price.” Foulon et al. (2002) state that
such programs do indeed create additional and strong incentives for pollution control, and improve the
environmental performance of polluters.
On the contrary, there are virtually no papers addressing PDPs from a theoretical point of view2. The
objective of this paper is to ﬁll this gap by providing a simple theoretical framework to study the impact
of a PDP on the optimal policies of the ﬁrm as compared to traditional instruments. Our aim is to sort
out the mechanisms by which a PDP determines the optimal response of the ﬁrms and its economic and
environmental consequences. We do so by connecting environmental policy modelling to the literature on
ﬁrms’ goodwill accumulation. The point of view taken here is that the information on the environmental
behavior of the ﬁrm aﬀects its image (goodwill), and ultimately, its proﬁt. In our model, this impact is
endogenous, i.e., a ﬁrm polluting less than its prescribed target would win consumer sympathy and raise its
goodwill, whereas it is the other way around when the ﬁrm exceeds its emissions quota. The evolution of
this goodwill is assumed to also depend, as in standard models in this area, on advertising expenditures. In
this framework, the latter can be seen as any green activity or any communication eﬀort conducted by the
ﬁrm to enhance its environmental image. The concept of goodwill (or brand equity) is inherently dynamic
and so is our model. We view the ﬁrm’s goodwill as a stock (i.e., capital or state variable) fuelled by
two ﬂows; one environmental (by means of the PDP) and the other, the communication eﬀort emanating
from the ﬁrm (advertising). By using a dynamic approach we capture, ﬁrst, the fact that it takes time for
consumers to get aware of the environmental behaviour ﬁrms and, second, that ﬁrms make their decisions
about their economic and environmental performance considering not only the immediate eﬀects on proﬁt,
but also the impact on future conditions.
Although our main focus is on the eﬀect of a PDP, by considering also a traditional regulation in
2A couple of exceptions are Kenney et al. (1994), that identiﬁes a market failure in the provision of information about
polluting consumer products, and Cohen and Santhakumar (2007), that presents a bargaining model between a polluter and







  the form of a tax/subsidy program, we are able to look at the eﬀects of each type of regulation with
and without the other. Our main contributions lay in the simultaneous consideration of both types of
regulation within a single dynamic framework, the endogenous determination of the impact of an emission
standard on a ﬁrm’s policies, and more importantly, the consideration of a link between the goodwill of
the ﬁrm, its environmental record and its proﬁt. Within this framework, we analyse how a PDP aﬀects
the ﬁrm’s optimal policies regarding emissions, pricing and advertising as compared to a market-based
environmental regulation and the laissez-faire situation (i.e., in the absence of regulation). We also study
under which conditions a PDP may be proﬁt improving. Finally, we connect this issue to the possibility
that a PDP can result in overcompliance (i.e., a situation in which ﬁrm decided to pollute even less than
stated by the standard).
The model is set up in Section 2 and the ﬁrm’s optimal policy is derived in Section 3. We show that
the optimal pricing and advertising policies turn out to be increasing in the goodwill, which implies that
advertising acts as a complementary device to pricing. Moreover, and perhaps more surprisingly, emissions
are also increasing in goodwill, since a ﬁrm that enjoys a high goodwill can aﬀord to pollute more without
suﬀering too much in terms of lost demand. We conclude that goodwill turns out to be a key driving force
for the ﬁrms policy and its reaction to environmental regulation. We also identify the long run solution
and the factors that determine its stability. We conclude that market-based instruments do not matter for
stability, but a PDP may help to render the steady state stable.
In Section 4, we compare the impact of the two types of regulation on the environmental performance
of the ﬁrm. It is immediate to conclude that any environmental policy will increase price, reduce output,
and therefore pollution, to some extent, and combining two diﬀerent policy instruments will always result
in a stronger eﬀect than implementing only one of them. Nevertheless, the results are not so clear-cut
when a market-based instrument is compared to a PDP. Indeed, we come up with the conclusions that
the eﬀects of disclosure strategies are more pronounced than those of traditional instruments for well-
established brands (i.e., those with a high goodwill). In our setting, it also turns out that those policies
which are more eﬀective to control pollution are also more detrimental for consumers surplus and, therefore,
there is a conﬂict between environmental improvement and economic welfare. Concerning advertising, we
conclude, ﬁrst, that implementing a traditional environmental policy (either a PDP exists or not) always
leads to less advertising; second, if the emission standard is tight enough, ﬁrms will advertise more under
a market-based than under a disclosure regulation and, third, a PDP renders the advertising policy of the







  under a dual regulatory regime is lower than under a traditional (market-based) one, which in turn is
lower than under a laissez-faire policy but, if a PDP exists, including a market-based regulation decreases
goodwill if and only if the PDP is soft enough. On the other hand, if the standard is mild enough ﬁrms
will tend to accumulate higher levels of goodwill under a PDP than under a traditional regulation. An
interesting issue to note is that a standard or target level for emissions plays a totally diﬀerent role under
a market-based regulation and under a PDP approach. In the former case, the standard implies just a
ﬁxed eﬀect on proﬁts and, therefore, does not aﬀect the ﬁrm behaviour. Conversely, in the latter case, the
standard crucially aﬀects the dynamics of goodwill and the optimal response of the ﬁrm.
In Section 5 we investigate the possibility that environmental regulation increases ﬁrms’ proﬁt and the
existence of overcompliance. As a matter of fact, we show that there is a strong connection between these
two issues: indeed, making environmental policy (either information or market-based) marginally more
intense is proﬁt improving if and only if, it is optimal for the ﬁrm to overcomply with the emission standard
for a long enough period. We also conclude that the proﬁt eﬀect of a PDP and the ﬁrm’s goodwill is an
inverted U-shaped function or, in other words, that a PDP cannot be proﬁt-improving for very low values
or for very high values of goodwill.
In order to get some additional insights we provide a numerical illustration in Section 6. In our
example, the short run ranking of prices induced by diﬀerent policies gets reversed in the long run due to
the dynamic impact of goodwill accumulation. This serves to illustrate how the dynamic nature of ﬁrms
decisions regarding goodwill accumulation can be a fundamental issue for the design of environmental
policy. We also conclude that tightening either environmental instrument always leads to a lower steady-
state goodwill and the eﬀects of a PDP are typically more intense than those of a traditional policy. Finally,
in Section 7, some concluding remarks are made.
2 The Model
We assume that a ﬁrm operates under monopoly or monopolistic competition. By doing so, we abstract
from strategic interaction and focus just on the direct eﬀects of environmental policy on the behaviour of
the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm produces a good at a constant unit cost c. Each instant of time t ∈ [0,∞), the ﬁrm faces
demand q(t). We assume that demand depends negatively on price, p(t), and positively on the goodwill
(or brand equity) of the ﬁrm, denoted as G(t), according to the standard linear demand speciﬁcation:







  which assumes that the product’s market potential, i.e., the demand when the price tends towards zero,
is given by a constant a > 0, which corresponds to an “average” or “normal” market potential, plus the
goodwill G(t). In principle, the sign of the latter is not restricted and it depends on the ﬁrm’s environmental
record and on its advertising policy. For simplicity, we will focus on situations with positive goodwill.
Denote by e(t) the (ﬂow of) pollutant emissions that are an inevitable by-product of production. We
suppose a simple proportional relationship between emissions and production, i.e., e(t) = αq(t), with
0 < α < 1. We introduce also a reference level for emissions, ¯ e, which can be interpreted as a standard,
i.e., an objective level considered as acceptable by the regulator or a commitment resulting from some
signed agreement3. To ﬁx ideas, we will refer to this level as a standard.
In order to compare market-based and disclosure strategies for pollution control, we introduce both of
such policy instruments, in the simplest possible way. Concerning the market-based instrument, suppose
that the regulator taxes (subsidizes), at a given rate τ ≥ 0, each unit of emissions above (below) the target
or the standard assigned to the ﬁrm. Then, the quantity τ (e(t) − ¯ e) represents a revenue for the ﬁrm if it
pollutes below the standard (i.e., e(t) < ¯ e), or a cost, otherwise. For simplicity, we assume equal tax and
subsidy rates, although this need not to be the case in reality4. Note that this simple setting can also be
interpreted as a tradeable pollution permits system (which is another important market-based instrument).
Indeed, ¯ e can be deﬁned as the number of emissions permits allocated to the ﬁrm by the regulator, and
τ as the price of a permit in the competitive market. Thus, the quantity τ (e(t) − ¯ e) would represent the
revenue the ﬁrm can obtain from selling unused permits in this market (if e(t) < ¯ e), or the cost of buying
permits if it is the other way around. Finally, if τ is interpreted as a ﬁne instead of a tax, this instrument
resembles a command-and-control strategy in the form of a traditional standard on emissions.
The second environmental policy instrument is a PDP. We model this instrument by resorting to the
dynamic approach introduced by Nerlove and Arrow (1962) for advertising. Starting from this seminal
paper, there is an extensive literature dealing with advertising and goodwill. See the surveys by Feichtinger
et al. (1994) for optimal control models and Jørgensen and Zaccour (2004) for the competitive setting.
Here we assume that the amount of pollution is revealed to the public, who cares about the level of
compliance ¯ e − e(t). As a consequence, the ﬁrm’s goodwill increases (or decreases, if ¯ e < e(t)) by the
amount ϕ(¯ e − e(t)), where ϕ ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring the sensitivity of goodwill with respect to
3We do not address the question of how the standard is determined. A traditional way of doing so is to assume that the
regulator chooses the standard that corresponds to the socially optimal output. Below we provide some insights about what
are the consequences of changing this value.
4Considering the case with diﬀerent tax and subsidy rates is computationally more complex because it introduces a








  the environmental record of the ﬁrm. This parameter can also be interpreted as a policy parameter
measuring the intensity of the disclosure program. Speciﬁcally, if no PDP is implemented, we have ϕ = 0,
meaning that the environmental information is not revealed or, alternatively, it does not have any impact
on consumers’ preferences. The value of ϕ represents the extent to which information is transmitted to
the consumers and reﬂected by their purchase decisions.
Following the Nerlove and Arrow approach, we assume that the ﬁrm can increase its goodwill by
doing some advertising eﬀort, denoted as A(t). In this framework, A(t) can be interpreted, not only as
advertising itself, but more broadly as any "green activity", i.e., any action that serves to improve the
ﬁrm’s environmental image. The interpretation of the advertising message can be diﬀerent depending on
the sign of the term (¯ e − e(t)). If it is positive, then the message would put forward the idea that the
ﬁrm is environmentally responsible and is a good citizen. Conversely, if ¯ e < e(t), the ﬁrm would probably
be perceived by society as a polluter. Therefore, the advertising message would attempt to provide an
explanation about why it is so diﬃcult to meet the target. We assume that one unit of advertising or
green activities results in a marginal increase of goodwill equal to θA(t), where θ is a positive parameter
measuring advertising eﬃciency.
The evolution of the goodwill of the ﬁrm is governed by the following diﬀerential equation:
˙ G(t) = θA(t) + ϕ(¯ e − e(t)) − δG(t), G(0) = Go > 0, (2)
where δ is the decay rate and represents the speed at which goodwill depreciates if no advertising is made.
The initial value of goodwill, Go, is assumed to be given and positive. The above speciﬁcation extends the
standard Nerlove and Arrow (1962) dynamics by adding the term ϕ(¯ e − e(t)), which is intended to capture
the impact of the regulator’s public disclosure program on the ﬁrm’s goodwill. Thus, we consider that the
evolution of the ﬁrm’s goodwill depends not only on the ﬁrm’s advertising eﬀort, but also on its emissions
behavior. If the ﬁrm exceeds (meets) the target set by the regulator, then it loses (attracts) consumers
who are sensitive to environmental issues. When the ﬁrm meets its target, then its goodwill increases
and so does, ceteris paribus, its market potential. If the ﬁrm does not reach its target (¯ e < e(t)), then its
goodwill suﬀers. If the latter eﬀect is higher (in absolute value) than the positive impact of advertising,
then the goodwill decreases and so does the ﬁrm’s market potential.




proﬁt maximizing behavior, and denoting by r the discount rate, the objective functional of the ﬁrm then















(p(t) − c − τα)(a + G(t) − p(t)) −
1
2
A2(t) + τ¯ e
￿
dt. (3)
By (2)-(3) we have deﬁned an inﬁnite-horizon optimal control problem with one state variable (G(t))
and two controls (p(t) ≥ 0,A(t) ≥ 0). In the sequel, we will eliminate the time argument when no confusion
may arise.
3 The Optimal Policy of the Firm
Using dynamic programming, we ﬁnd the closed-loop solution of the ﬁrm’s problem. We denote by
y (G;ϕ,τ) the optimal value of decision variable y (y = p, A, e) for given values of the goodwill and the
environmental policy parameters ϕ and τ. Similarly V (G;ϕ,τ) denotes the value function. For simplicity,
we focus on interior solutions. For notation convenience, we deﬁne the following auxiliary coeﬃcients:
m ≡ a − c − ατ (4)
v ≡ r + 2δ + αϕ (5)
x ≡ 2θ
2 + α2ϕ2 (6)
and, for technical reasons, we make the following assumptions:
1.- m > 0, which ensures that the ﬁrm produces a positive quantity when its goodwill is zero.
2.- v2 > x, to ensure the existence of a real solution.
Under these assumptions, the following proposition characterizes the optimal policy of the ﬁrm for an
interior solution.
Proposition 1 In an interior solution, the optimal pricing and advertising policies of the ﬁrm and the
value function are given by
p(G;ϕ,τ) =
a + c + τα + G(ϕαk1 + 1) + ϕαk2
2
, (7)





























2x + 2ϕk2 (2¯ e − αm) + 4¯ eτ + m2￿
(12)
Proof. See Appendix.
Since k1, k2 > 0, it is immediate to conclude that the solution is interior (i.e., p > 0, A > 0) if G > 0.
Below we identify conditions under which this is always the case.
Proposition 1 shows that, as a consequence of the linear-quadratic structure of the problem, the optimal
pricing and advertising policies turn out to be both linear in the goodwill. Recalling that the advertising
cost is C(A) = A2
2 , (8) states that the level of advertising is chosen so that the marginal cost is equal to
the marginal revenue, i.e., the marginal impact on goodwill times the marginal impact of goodwill on the




∂G are clearly positive. These results appear to be consistent with observed reality, since
well-established brands, in terms of quality, consumer perception, etc., typically command a higher price,
and are usually heavily advertised, precisely to reinforce the brand positioning. In that sense, advertising
acts as a complementary device to pricing. Indeed, it renders consumers less sensitive to price, or to put it
diﬀerently, it increases their willingness-to-pay. The pricing result is consistent with the one in Kriström
and Lundgren (2003) who argue that “If consumers prefer to buy products from a greener ﬁrm, then the
cost of being environmentally friendly may be justiﬁed by higher revenues.”
Using (7), we get the following optimal value for emissions:
e(G;ϕ,τ) = αq(G;ϕ,τ) = α(a + G − p(G;ϕ,τ)), (13)
= α
￿




It is shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that 1 − ϕαk1 > 0, and therefore, that emissions are increasing
in goodwill which, at ﬁrst sight, may seem counterintuitive. The interpretation is that a ﬁrm that enjoys
a high goodwill can aﬀord to pollute more without suﬀering too much in terms of lost demand. Never-
theless, there is also the reverse causal eﬀect with opposite sign: more emissions result in less goodwill,







  circular relationship between goodwill, price and demand (and hence emissions). Increasing the price, ce-
teris paribus, reduces demand, which results in lower emissions. This leads to higher goodwill, which shifts
output upward, thanks to the demand by consumers having a preference for green products, and this in
turn leads to higher emissions, which softens the initial eﬀect.
By substitution in Proposition 1, it is immediate to obtain, as particular cases, the results when any
of the environmental policy instrument is no used. In the sequel, yT ≡ y(G;0,τ) will denote the optimal
value of variable y when only a traditional (market-based) policy, and not a PDP is implemented (ϕ = 0).
Similarly, yPDP ≡ y (G;ϕ,0) refers to the situation in which only a PDP and not a market-based policy is
implemented (τ = 0). Finally, yLF ≡ y(G;0,0) corresponds to the laissez-faire situation (ϕ = τ = 0). For
the case where both instruments are used at the same time, we will use the superscript GC, which stands
for "general case". In section 4 the diﬀerent policy regimes are compared.
Since all the variables can be written as a function of goodwill, by substitution in (2) the system
collapses to a unidimensional diﬀerential equation in G. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the whole
model can be studied by focusing on this equation. We start by computing the steady state and checking
its stability.
Proposition 2 The steady state goodwill is given by
Gss (ϕ,τ) =





and is globally asymptotically stable if and only if
2δ(r + δ + αϕ) + rαϕ > θ
2 (15)
Proof. See Appendix.
Global asymptotic stability means that the solution trajectory will converge to its steady-state value for
any initial condition. The condition derived in the above proposition identiﬁes the factors that determine
the possibility to get a stable solution: the higher is the discount rate (r), the decay rate (δ), and the factor
of emissions per unit of production (α), and the lower is the eﬃciency of advertising (θ), then the easier
is the realization of the global asymptotical stability. Concerning the environmental policy variables, note
that the stability condition does not depend on the market-based instrument (as represented by τ) but it
does depend on the intensity of the disclosure strategy (as measured by ϕ). The reason for this result is







  key dynamic mechanism of the model. On the other hand, the PDP is designed precisely to determine
the dynamics of goodwill. A side-eﬀect of this measure is that it contributes to stability. Therefore, the
most unfavourable case for stability is that without a PDP (ϕ = 0). In this case, the stability condition
collapses to:
2δ(δ + r) > θ
2.
In the sequel, we will assume that this condition holds, in order to ensure stability in all the cases.
Then, the optimal goodwill trajectory is given by














Therefore, if the stability condition holds, the goodwill converges asymptotically to its steady state
value. By substitution in (7), (8) and (13), it is also possible to obtain the steady state and the optimal
trajectories for p, A and e. Since all three variables are increasing in G, if Go > Gss convergence of G, p,
A and e to the steady state is from above and it is from below if Go < Gss.
Note that, under the global asymptotic stability condition, the denominator of Gss is strictly positive.
Thus, the steady state has the same sign as its numerator, i.e.,
Gss ≥ 0 ⇔ xk2 ≥ ϕ(αm − 2¯ e). (16)
Condition (16), together with G0 > 0, ensures that, in a stable solution, G is always positive and this
fact, together with (7), (8), (10), (11) ensure that the solution is always interior.
It is immediate to check that (16) trivially holds if ϕ = 0. Therefore, in the absence of a PDP, the
globally asymptotic steady-state goodwill is always positive. The reason for this result is the following: if
there is not a PDP, the ﬁrm’s advertising eﬀort is pure addition to goodwill, and hence, to market potential.
In the general case, part of this advertising is done to (possibly) oﬀset the negative environmental record.
This is especially the case when the standard is “too” restrictive, and therefore, very costly to meet.
12 
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  4 Comparing policy regimes
The general framework we have constructed so far allows us to consider market-based and/or disclosure
approaches for environmental policies. An interesting feature of this approach is the possibility to compare
the consequences of diﬀerent policy options. Speciﬁcally, there are four relevant policy regimes to be
considered: the most general scenario with both policy instruments, only the traditional policy (i.e.,
ϕ = 0), only the PDP (i.e., τ = 0), and no policy instrument at all (ϕ = τ = 0), or laissez-faire situation.
One ﬁrst interesting issue to be noted here is the role of the standard ¯ e. Consider ﬁrst the traditional
situation (ϕ = 0). In this case, the state equation (2) does not depend on ¯ e and, therefore, the only
eﬀect of the standard on the solution is through the term τ¯ e, which appears as a constant in the objective
functional (3). As a consequence, the policy of the ﬁrm (i.e., the optimal value of variables p, A, e) does
not depend on ¯ e at all. The only role of the standard is, then, to increase or decrease the value function
through coeﬃcient k3.
The situation is totally diﬀerent when a PDP is implemented (ϕ > 0). In this case, the value of
the standard enters directly the dynamic goodwill mechanism and it turns out to be a key variable to
determine the behaviour of the ﬁrm. Actually, it enters the optimal value of p, A and e through coeﬃcient
k2. Speciﬁcally, an increment in ¯ e increases the value of k2, which, in turn, increases p and A. Interestingly,
the increment of p reduces q and, hence, e (note in (13) that e depends negatively on k2 and, hence, on ¯ e).
Therefore, increasing the value of the standard results in a short-term reduction of emissions. Nevertheless,
this is a very short-term eﬀect, because the increment of ¯ e fuels the goodwill accumulation (and this eﬀect
is reinforced by the induced increment of advertising and the short-term reduction of emissions). The
higher value of goodwill induces an indirect increment of emissions in the long run. In our numerical
simulations we always obtain that the second eﬀect quickly overpowers the ﬁrst one.
We now compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent regimes on the price policies of the ﬁrm, as well as the environ-
mental eﬀects, measured by the level of emissions (which, under our speciﬁcation, is equivalent to studying
the behaviour of q).
Proposition 3 Consider a market-based environmental policy associated with a value of τ and a PDP
associated with a given value of ϕ. Then, for any given value of goodwill G, the following results hold:







  than implementing any single instrument, i.e.,
pGC > pT eGC < eT
pGC > pPDP eGC < ePDP
ii) In turn, implementing any single instrument increases the price and reduces emissions with respect to
the laissez-faire situation, i.e.,
pT > pLF eT < eLF
pPDP > pLF ePDP < eLF









2 is the value of k2 with
τ = 0, such that
pT ≤ pPDP, eT ≥ ePDP ⇔ G ≥ ˜ G
Proof. See Appendix.
Given the negative linear relationship between price and quantity, and the positive linear relationship
between quantity and emissions, the behaviour of these variables is necessarily linked. As for the environ-
ment, the two ﬁrst parts of the proposition are not very surprising: any environmental policy will reduce
output, and therefore pollution, to some extent, and combining two diﬀerent policy instruments will always
result in a stronger eﬀect than implementing only one of them. The third part is less obvious and it states
that pollution is more sensitive to disclosure strategies than to traditional instruments if goodwill is high
enough. The policy implication of this result is that ﬁrms with well-established brands (i.e., with a high
goodwill) would probably prefer a traditional regulation (which they can actually aﬀord thanks to their
high price, or equivalently to a high consumer willingness-to-pay), because a disclosure mechanism may
hurt their prestige. The threshold that determines which policy option is more eﬀective for cutting down
emissions depends directly on τ and ϕ in an obvious way but it also depends on all model parameters
(through k1 and kPDP





> τ, which states
that a PDP will be more eﬀective if the marginal impact of information disclosure is higher than the
marginal tax/subsidy rate.
Just the opposite results hold for price: a dual regulation leads to a higher price to consumer than
does any individual regulation, which in turn induces a higher price than does the laissez-faire scenario. A
simple explanation is that, to some extent, the ﬁrm is shifting to the consumer the cost increase that results







  value of goodwill. Since consumer surplus increases when the solution moves downward the demand curve
(i.e, when quantity increases and price decreases), Proposition 3 provides very straightforward results for
consumer surplus (CS):
CSGC < CST < CSLF,
CSGC < CSPDP < CSLF,
CST > CSPDP ⇔ G ≥ ˜ G.
where ˜ G was deﬁned above.
The consumer surplus would be obviously higher under laissez-faire policy than under any regulation,
and both regulations, if applied simultaneously, would harm surplus more than a single one. On the other
hand, when goodwill is high the ﬁrm will be more sensitive (i.e., the quantity will decrease and the price
will increase more) to a disclosure strategy than to a market-based instrument. Therefore, for high values
of G, consumer surplus will suﬀer a larger reduction under a PDP than under a market-based instrument.
At ﬁrst sight, this result may seem somehow paradoxical: disclosing environmental information about
well established ﬁrms may have a detrimental eﬀect on consumers’ welfare. Note however, that CS only
provides a measure for consumer welfare from a purely economic point of view. In the presence of pollution
(and, hence, externalities), a fully-ﬂedged welfare analysis would require a valuation of the welfare eﬀect
of pollution.
The comparative results of the advertising strategies are not so clear-cut. Table 1 presents suﬃcient
conditions for the relevant cases:
Table 1: Comparison of Advertising Strategies
AT APDP ALF
AGC < if ¯ e <
α(a−c−ατ)
2 < < if ¯ e <
α(a−c−ατ)
2




APDP = < if ¯ e <
α(a−c)
2
A ﬁrst result is that, for a given ϕ (either positive or zero), implementing a traditional environmental









 This can be explained as follows: introducing a traditional regulation induces a reduction in emissions,
and in turn, a reduction in the deviation with respect to the standard. Consequently, less advertising is
needed to achieve the same goodwill. On the other hand, if the standard ¯ e is low enough, ceteris paribus,
the ﬁrm advertises at a lower level when there is a PDP (ϕ > 0) than in the absence of a PDP (ϕ = 0).
To understand this result, note that, from (8) and (11), it is immediate to conclude that A is increasing
in ¯ e if ϕ > 0, while it does not depend on ¯ e when ϕ = 0. The reason for this result is that the only
channel through which the standard may inﬂuence advertising is by its impact on goodwill. The higher
the standard, the easier it is to build up goodwill and, therefore, the more productive (in terms of future
proﬁts) it is to do advertising. By a similar argument, we conclude that, if the standard is tight enough,
ﬁrms will advertise more under a market-based than under a disclosure regulation. To shed a light on the
interpretation of the thresholds, note that








Since the building up of goodwill is the key mechanism of this paper, it is also interesting to analyse
how a change in the value of goodwill aﬀects the policy of the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, we ask how diﬀerent
policy regimes aﬀect the slope of the advertising policy with respect to goodwill. Proposition 4 shows the
remarkable result that, while the order of the advertising strategies depends on the model parameters,
their slopes with respect to goodwill do not.














This Proposition states that the advertising policy of the ﬁrm is less sensitive to the value of goodwill
when a PDP is in place and this sensitivity does not depend on the presence of a market-based instrument.
The rationale behind these results is the following: the tax/subsidy has an instantaneous impact of proﬁt







  policy is not relevant to determine how the ﬁrm reacts to changes in its brand equity. On the other hand,
a PDP goes right to the goodwill accumulation mechanism. Actually, there are two factors that aﬀect the
ﬁrm’s advertising decision: the current situation of its brand equity and the impact of emissions by means
of the disclosure strategy. The ﬁrm must react to these driving forces taking into account that advertising
is costly and, moreover, the marginal cost is increasing. When the second driving force does not exist, the
ﬁrm can concentrate on reacting to changes in goodwill. Conversely, if a PDP is implemented, the ﬁrm
must react to both factors at the same time and, advertising costs being convex, the marginal reaction to
each of them will be necessarily softer.
We now investigate how the steady state depends on the environmental policy regime. Proposition 5
illustrates how the long run value of goodwill behaves in each case.












Moreover, there exists one threshold value of the standard, ˜ e, such that
GPDP
ss > GT
ss ⇔ ¯ e > ˜ e.
Proof. See Appendix.
It turns out that the steady-state value of goodwill achieved under a dual regulatory regime is lower
than under a traditional (market-based) one, which in turn is lower than under a laissez-faire policy. This
seems a natural result since the environmental policy makes it harder to build up goodwill. Nevertheless,
the result is not so clear-cut when a tax/subsidy is implemented once a PDP already exists (i.e., when we
move from the PDP regime to the GC regime). Actually, including a market-based regulation decreases
goodwill if and only if the PDP is soft enough (i.e., ϕ is low enough). The reason is that, including a
tax/subsidy program will result in additional emission reductions and, if goodwill is sensitive enough to
the environmental results of the ﬁrm (i.e., if ϕ is high enough) this can result in a long-run improvement
of the image of the ﬁrm. On the other hand, ﬁrms will tend to accumulate higher levels of goodwill under
a PDP than under a traditional regulation if and only if the standard is mild enough (¯ e > ˜ e). In order
to interpret this conclusion note that, from (14), we conclude that the steady-state value of goodwill does







  again, that under a PDP building up goodwill is easier if and only if the standard is mild enough.
5 Environmental policy ﬁrm’s proﬁts and overcompliance
In this section, we study the eﬀects of environmental regulation on the proﬁt of the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, we
ask under which conditions is it possible that environmental policy has a positive, rather than negative
eﬀect on proﬁts. We will show that there is a strong connection between the possibility that increasing the
intensity of either of the environmental polices has a positive eﬀect on discounted proﬁts and the existence
of overcompliance. We deﬁne overcompliance as e < ¯ e, i.e., a situation in which the ﬁrm decides to cut
down its emissions below the standard. Symmetrically, we can deﬁne undercompliance as a situation in
which the standard is violated: e > ¯ e. Therefore, the value of the standard turns out to be a key to
determine the marginal eﬀect of policy instruments on ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Overcompliance is a phenomenon
that has been recently addressed in the literature. For example, Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) show
how, with consumers’ preferences for environmental quality and publicly available information, minimum
environmental standards are overmet. More recently, Arguedas (2005) explores the possibility that ﬁrms
and regulators achieve cooperative agreements in environmental regulation, and show that all the policies
in the bargaining set induce the ﬁrm to exceed the standard. Lundgren (2003) and Kriström and Lundgren
(2003) suggest that goodwill accumulation can explain overcompliance. This is also the main mechanism
in our paper.
Deﬁne the Hamiltonian of the ﬁrm’s problem as
H = exp(−rt)
￿
(p(t) − c − τα)(a + G(t) − p(t)) −
1
2
A2(t) + τ¯ e
￿
+ µ[θA(t) + ϕ(¯ e − e(t)) − δG(t)]
where µ is the costate variable and it is easy to check that, in an interior solution, µ > 0.6
Following Caputo (1990), we know that the derivative of the discounted proﬁts with respect to a para-
meter can be computed by integrating the derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to that parameter and
evaluating the result in the optimal solution. Therefore, we can compute the derivative of the discounted













6Actually, comparing the Pontryagin Maximum Principle conditions with the ﬁrst order conditions associated to the H-J-B







 Softening the standard (i.e., increasing ¯ e) obviously has a nonnegative eﬀect on proﬁts. In the laissez-
faire situation, since τ = ϕ = 0, this eﬀect is zero because there is no link between emissions and proﬁt.
If a market-based instrument is implemented, softening the standard reduces the amount of taxes paid
or increases the amount of subsidy received at each moment of time. The discounted value of this eﬀect
on total proﬁts, τ
r, is higher the lower is the discount rate (i.e., the more concerned the ﬁrm is about the
future). On the other hand, if a PDP is in place, softening the standard beneﬁts the ﬁrm because it is
easier to build up goodwill. Therefore the instantaneous economic value of this change can be calculated
as the marginal eﬀect of the standard on proﬁt accumulation (ϕ) times the shadow price of goodwill, as
measured by µ(t).
In turn, the derivative of discounted proﬁt with respect to the tax/subsidy and the intensity of the












{µ(t)(¯ e − e(t))}dt
where e(t) is the optimal value of emissions. If the tax/subsidy rate marginally increases, the instantaneous
eﬀect of this change is equal to ¯ e−e(t). If the ﬁrm is overcomplying (undercomplying), i.e., e < ¯ e (e > ¯ e),
then its proﬁt will increase (decrease) with τ. Similarly, the eﬀect of a marginal increase in ϕ is µ(¯ e − e(t)),
where µ measures the discounted unit value of (¯ e − e(t)). The ﬁnal discounted eﬀect on proﬁts of these
changes result from the time aggregation of instantaneous eﬀects.
It turns out that, for both of the derivatives displayed above, their values can only be positive if the ﬁrm
overcomplies (i.e., if ¯ e > e(t)) for, at least, some time. If ¯ e > e(t) (¯ e < e(t)) throughout all the planning
period, then the overall eﬀect is trivially positive (negative). It is also possible that the ﬁrm overcomplies
for one period and undercomplies for other period. In this case, the ﬁnal eﬀect will be positive if and
only if the aggregation of the positive period is higher than the negative one. Since we have showed that,
in an interior solution, e converges smoothly to its steady state value, this condition can be translated
into a condition about the length of the overcompliance period. Therefore, we have proven the following
proposition:
Proposition 6 The discounted proﬁt of the ﬁrm depends positively on τ and ϕ if and only if it is optimal
for the ﬁrm to overcomply with the emission standard for a long enough period.







  what extent the ﬁrm decides to overcomply.
In our framework, a ﬁrst trivial channel by which the ﬁrm may be interested in overcomplying is by
means of the subsidy. Indeed, if polluting below the standard is subsidized by τ, it is not surprising that
it might be proﬁt improving for ﬁrms to do so. The second channel is more interesting for our purpose: if
a PDP is in place, even if there is no immediate reward for cutting down emissions, ﬁrms might accept an
instantaneous cost in exchange of improving their environmental image and enjoy higher demand in the
future (as suggested by Lundgren (2003) and Kriström and Lundgren (2003)).
Using (13) we can compute ¯ e − e(t) and check if the ﬁrm is over- or undercomplying under any given
policy scenario. The result is particularly simple in the traditional case, since the optimal level of emissions
do not depend on the value of the standard:




and we conclude that, in a stable solution, the level of overcompliance is time-increasing (or the level of
undercompliance is time-decreasing) if and only if G0 > Gss, i.e., if convergence to the steady state is from




















The same procedure can be applied to determine the level of overcompliance when a PDP exists, but
the results are more complicated since the optimal value of emissions depend on ¯ e.
In order to get some additional information about the eﬀect of a PDP on proﬁts, we compare the
situation before and after the introduction of a PDP. Deﬁne D(G) as the diﬀerence in the value function
(or, alternatively, the discounted proﬁts) before and after implementing a PDP, as a function of goodwill,
i.e.:
D(G) ≡ V GC − V T ≡ V (G;ϕ,τ) − V (G;0,τ)
Proposition 7 The following results hold:
















3 are the values of k1, k2 and k3 when
ϕ = 0, introducing a PDP has a non-positive impact on the value function. Otherwise, there exists two







  Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 7 states that the relationship between the proﬁt impact of a PDP and the ﬁrm’s goodwill,
as given by D(G), is an inverted U-shaped function. Therefore, the PDP could be beneﬁcial for ﬁrms with
"intermediate" values of goodwill, but it can never be proﬁt-improving for very low values or for very high
values of goodwill. The interpretation of this fact is that ﬁrms with a very poor image would never be
interested in a disclosure program and the same applies for very well-established ﬁrms, who might consider
that a PDP would threaten their position.
6 Simulation
To get an additional insight into the nature of the solution and the comparison between diﬀerent policies,
we provide a numerical illustration. The model has nine parameters, namely a,c,r,α,δ,θ,¯ e,τ,ϕ and one
initial condition for G(0) = G0. Figure 1 shows the solution for the following parameter values:
a = 100,c = 5,r = 0.10,α = 0.05,δ = 0.05,θ = 0.10,
¯ e = 6,τ = 12,ϕ = 0.05,G0 = 185.
Given these parameter values, the steady state values for goodwill are:
GLF
ss = 190, GT
ss = 188.8, GPDP
ss = 182.8, GGC
ss = 181.7
and, therefore, we have GGC
ss < GPDP
ss < G0 < GT
ss < GLF
ss . As a consequence, the convergence to the
steady state is from above (G is decreasing) for a disclosure strategy and for the general case, and it is
from below (G is increasing) for a market-based policy and for the laissez-faire situation. Consistently
with these long-run values for goodwill, optimal advertising expenditures are ranked in the same way (as
predicted by Proposition 3).
Concerning pollution, with these parameter values, a PDP turns out to be much more eﬀective than a
traditional policy in the sense that emissions are always lower and decreasing whereas they are higher and
increasing under a market-based regulation. As expected, if both instruments are combined, emissions are
even lower.
The most remarkable results are those related to price behaviour. Initially, the price is higher when







  which, in turn, is higher than in the laissez-faire situation. These are the predicted results by the theory
(Proposition 3) because goodwill is initially the same in all the regimes. Nevertheless, since price is
increasing in goodwill and, in turn, GT and GLF is increasing while GPDP and GGC is decreasing, it
turns out that, in the long run, price is higher under a traditional regulation than under a PDP. Moreover,
contrary to what one may expect a priori, price is higher in the laissez-faire situation than under any policy
instrument and higher under a single policy than under a dual one. The reason for this counterintuitive
result lays in the goodwill building up mechanism, which in the long rung dominates the cost shifting
mechanism that tends to increase price under any environmental instrument. These results illustrate that
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Figure 1: comparing the solution with a PDP and a market-based policy
Figure 2 shows how the discounted value of proﬁts (or, alternatively, the value function evaluated in
t = 0) depends on the standard, ¯ e. Obviously, the standard does not have any eﬀect in the laissez-faire







  because they are virtually identical to those under a PDP). For very tough (=low) values of the standard,
any policy (either a PDP or market-based) is proﬁt detrimental. As the standard gets milder, discounted
proﬁt gets higher. For a soft enough standard, discounted proﬁt under an environmental policy, either
a PDP or a market-based instrument, becomes higher than under laissez-faire. Given these parameter
values, proﬁt is more sensitive to the standard under a PDP than under a traditional regulation. As a
matter of fact, if the standard is very tough, V PDP is considerable lower than under a tax-subsidy and it















Figure 2. Eﬀects of ¯ e on discounted proﬁt.
Figure 3 illustrates the eﬀect of including a PDP in the solution, i.e., the value of D(G) ≡ V GC − V T
depending on the initial condition of goodwill. As predicted by Proposition 7, D(G) has an inverted U
shape. In other words, the eﬀect of a PDP is negative for very low and for very high values of goodwill
and it can only be positive for intermediate values. In our example, "very low" involves negative values.
Since we are focusing on positive values of goodwill, we can summarize our results saying that a PDP has
positive eﬀects for low and positive values of goodwill and negative eﬀects for high values of goodwill. The
reason is that, for well established ﬁrms, goodwill is an important asset, and they are more prone to suﬀer
from a policy that may erode it. Figure 3 also shows that, consistently with our previous discussion, the
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Figure 3. Eﬀect of a PDP on proﬁt depending on G
In order to complete this simulation exercise, we have also explored the eﬀects of diﬀerent policies
combinations on the steady state by trying diﬀerent values of τ and ϕ. Recalling that the tax rate τ
appears in the objective and the PDP parameter ϕ appears in the goodwill dynamics, we performed a
numerical simulations taking into account the “comparable” parameters, i.e., the production cost c (for τ)
and the marginal impact of advertising θ (for ϕ). Speciﬁcally, we tested the following combinations:
τ = 0,τ < c,τ = c,τ > c,
ϕ = 0,ϕ < θ,ϕ = θ,ϕ > θ,
which leads in total to 16 scenarios. This exercise allowed us to conclude, ﬁrst, that increasing the value
of either ϕ or τ, or both, leads to a lower steady-state goodwill and, second, that the impact of ϕ, on
both the steady-state goodwill and proﬁt, is much more pronounced then the impact of τ. This can be
attributed to the fact that ϕ hurts the market potential, whereas τ is “only” an additional cost. For
instance, multiplying by 10 the value of τ when ϕ is equal to 0.05 leads to a decrease in total proﬁt,
evaluated at the steady state, and in Gss of less than 1%. However, multiplying by 2 the value of ϕ when







  7 Conclusions
This paper has presented a setting where a regulator supplements the traditional tax/subsidy environ-
mental regulation by a public disclosure program. The latter aﬀects positively or negatively the brand
image and the market potential of the ﬁrm. This framework allows us to compare the eﬀects of a disclosure
strategy with those of a traditional (market-based) regulation. Both instruments are essentially diﬀerent in
the sense that the tax/subsidy has an immediate eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ proﬁt whereas the PDP acts through
a dynamic channel by determining the evolution of future demand.
We show how building up goodwill is a key mechanism to explain the economic and environmental
behaviour of the ﬁrm and its reaction to a disclosure strategy. The initial level of goodwill turns out to
be a crucial determinant for the optimal pricing and advertising strategies and also for the possibility that
a PDP is proﬁt improving. A notable result is that emissions are increasing in goodwill, which seems to
indicate that, paradoxically, a ﬁrm with a green reputation can aﬀord to pollute more to some extent. The
value of goodwill is also crucial to determine what policy instrument is more eﬀective.
We also conclude that, apart from reducing emissions, as a ﬁrst side-eﬀect, a PDP may help to render
the steady state stable. As a second interesting eﬀect, and for intermediate values of goodwill (neither too
high nor too low) introducing a PDP may be proﬁt improving.
The role of a standard or target level for emissions turns out to be totally diﬀerent under both policy
regimes. In the case of a tax/subsidy approach, this target level only acts as constant who increases or
decreases proﬁt by a ﬁxed amount, but it does not aﬀect the policy of the ﬁrm. On the contrary, if a PDP
is implemented, the target value for emissions enters in an important way in the goodwill accumulation
mechanism and determines how the ﬁrm reacts to the regulation and what is the time path for the economic
and environmental variables. Moreover, this value is also crucial to determine the possibility that a PDP
is proﬁt improving. A policy implication of this fact is that regulators should be particularly careful in
ﬁxing the emission standard when a PDP is applied.
A natural extension to our work is to consider an oligopolistic industry where ﬁrms compete for con-
sumers having a preference for greener products and to take abatement capital into account. A ﬁrst step







  8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To derive the optimal solution, we denote by V (G) the value function of the ﬁrm and write down its
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann (HJB) equation:
rV (G) = max
p,A
￿
(p − c − τα)(a + G − p) −
1
2
A2 + τ¯ e+ (17)
V ￿(G)(θA − ϕ(α(a + G − p) − ¯ e) − δG)}
Assuming an interior solution and performing the maximization on the right-hand side, we obtain the
following strategies
p(G) =
a + G + c + τα + ϕαV ￿
2
, (18)
A(G) = θV ￿. (19)
Inserting p(G) and A(G) from above into (17) leads to
rV (G) =
￿
m + G + ϕαV ￿
2
￿￿

























k1G2 + k2G + k3,























































































































Solving the ﬁrst equation gives
k1 =
(r + 2δ + αϕ) ±
￿













which, under the assumption ν2 > x, has too real positive solutions. We choose, for stability, to retain
the smallest one, i.e., the root with the negative sign. By straightforward successive substitutions one
obtains easily the expressions of k2 and k3 given in the Proposition.







































An, therefore, k2 > 0.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2












(α(m − αϕk2) − 2¯ e).
Substituting for k1, equating to zero and solving leads to the expression for the steady state.
The steady state is globally asymptotically stable if and only if the coeﬃcient of G in ˙ G above is
negative. After substitution for k1 and straightforward calculations, this is equivalent to
r −
￿







  which, rearranging, gives rise to (15).
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that
e(G;ϕ,τ) = α(a + G − p(G;ϕ,τ)).
After substitution for the price, we get





































from which the displayed conditions follow.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Recalling that the advertising strategies are given by
A(G;ϕ,τ) = θ(k1G + k2), A(G;0,τ) = θ
￿
kT









, A(G;0,0) = θ
￿
kT





2 is the value of k2 when τ = 0 whereas kT
1 and kT
2 are the values of k1 and k2 when ϕ = 0. It
suﬃces to compare k1 and kT







  8.5 Proof of Proposition 5




2δ(r + δ) − θ
2
￿
2δ(r + δ) − θ






2 − ϕα(r + δ)
￿
(a − c) + ϕ¯ e(2r + 2δ + αϕ)
.




−2δϕα(a − c)(r + δ)
2 + (2δr + 2δ
2 − θ




ϕα(a − c − 2ατ) + τ
￿
θ







ϕα(a − c − 2ατ) + τ
￿
θ
2 − 2δr − αϕr − 2δ
2￿￿




2)(2r + 2δ + αϕ)
≡ ˜ e
8.6 Proof of Proposition 7
The diﬀerence between a ﬁrm’s payoﬀs with and without a PDP is given by:






























2 + 2αϕ(r + 2δ)
.
Clearly k1is decreasing in ϕ, and hence k1 < kT
1 . This shows that D(G) is concave with limG→±∞ D(G) =
−∞ and it has a maximum at ¯ G, which is determined by


















Therefore, D(G) is an inverted U-shaped function. At ¯ G, we have


































.The following cases may arise:
1. ￿ ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ D( ¯ G) ≤ 0. In this case, D(G) ≤ 0,∀G ≥ 0, and the PDP has a non-positive impact on
the value function.













































between which D(G) is positive. Therefore, if the initial goodwill G0 is such that G1 ≤ G0 ≤ G2,then
the ﬁrm beneﬁts from a PDP; otherwise, such a program is proﬁt deteriorating.
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